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Zusammenfassung
Zwischenmenschliches Vertrauen, oder auch soziales Vertrauen, gilt im
Allgemeinen als Schlüsselfaktor sowohl für die wirtschaftliche als auch für
die demokratische Entwicklung. Ein Vergleich der Staaten in der
Ostseeregion zeigt soziales Vertrauen auf der Ebene der einzelnen Bürger
in Zusammenhang mit deren Engagement in sozialen und politischen
Verbänden sowie in Zusammenhang mit Erziehungswerten wie Phantasie
und Unabhängigkeit anstelle von Gehorsam und Anpassung. Sozialer
Status und politisches Zugehörigkeitsgefühl sind hingegen weniger wichtig.
Dennoch ist selbst nach Analyse dieser Faktoren das soziale Vertrauen in
den westlichen Staaten deutlich größer als in den östlichen, ehemals
kommunistischen Staaten. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass zur Herausbildung
von sozialem Vertrauen nationale und historische Erfahrungen ebenfalls
von Bedeutung sind.
Ole Borre, born 1932, is a professor emeritus of political sociology at the
Depart-ment of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark. His major
work has been in the series of Danish election studies 1971–2005, and
in comparative surveys of po-litical behaviour, attitudes, and
values. Contact: oleborre@hotmail.com.
Introduction1
Living in a complex society requires a good deal of trust in other people.
This includes trust in anonymous others, or what Anthony Giddens calls
faceless commitments.2 A person who keeps thinking that the water in the
water pipe may be poisoned, or that the car coming against him may turn
across the street without warning, will soon be deemed paranoid and
advised to subject himself to psychiatric treatment. The capacity for trusting
people whom one does not know is a necessary prerequisite for living in a
modern society. For this reason social trust, or interpersonal trust, is
considered an important sociological variable, as well as a precondition for
economic behaviour beyond the simple exchange of goods. By extending
trust to strangers, one is able to obtain valuable information and form
rational expectations as a basis for interaction with other members of
society.
But social trust is also an important political attitude. In many totalitarian
societies the citizens are unwilling to reveal their critical opinions even to
close friends or colleagues because they fear that the information will be
passed on to the authorities. And in a country that is torn by internal conflict,
many citizens prefer to join the silent majority rather than risk being
considered a menace to one or the other of the struggling parties. Hence,
the level of social trust becomes an indicator of a healthy civil society.
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by studying its correlates in the ten countries bordering the Baltic Sea,
Germany being divided into East and West Germany. Does the level of
social trust vary systematically among these countries, and among different
groups within each country, or is social trust and distrust concentrated in
particular groups in one country, but other groups in other countries? Can
we explain the national level of trust by focusing on individual factors, or is
there an important amount of variation in the national figures? First,
however, we look back towards earlier findings and hypotheses.
Previous research
For their pioneering five-nation study in 1959–60, Gabriel Almond and
Sidney Verba used a simple interview question to measure social trust:
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with other
people?
Their hypothesis, that social trust is a component of a democratic political
culture, or what they called a participant civic culture, was corroborated both
in regard to the different levels of social trust in the five nations and at the
level of the individual respondents. As for the first, the proportion who
thought that most people can be trusted varied from a high level of 56 to 58
percent in England and the United States to a low of seven percent in Italy,
West-Germany taking an intermediate position with 24 percent trusting.3
Thus the two countries with a long democratic tradition contrasted strongly
with the two that had recently been subject to a fascist rule. Later studies
which repeated the question corroborated this interpretation: between 1960
and 1990 the proportion with social trust increased in Italy to 35 percent,
while in West Germany the level of 39 percent was reached already in
1976.4
Meanwhile the interview question had spread to surveys in a number of
countries via comparative projects such as the Eurobarometer and the
European Values Survey (EVS). On the basis of data from the 1980s
Ronald Inglehart studied a sample of 23 nations and found clear structural
relations between the level of social trust and the national income per
inhabitant.5 Based on data from the 1990s he found in a sample of 43
nations a clear relation between the percentage showing social trust and
the length of unbroken democratic rule. Almost all those countries that had
a democratic rule already by 1920 had a level of trust between 40 and 70
percent, while almost all those that did not have a democratic rule by 1990
had a level between 15 and 40 percent. Altogether, democratic stability was
explained by social trust just as much as by average national income.6
In general, theories are not quite clear about the causal direction of the
relationships between the level of trust, the income level, and democratic
performance. It is probably best to think of these variables as interacting in
a system: an increase in either variable is hypothesized to have a positive
effect on the other two. However, this type of positive feedback appears not
to work as expected in predicting the development of social trust in some
mature democracies. For example, in some western countries the level of
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the fact that the level of income has risen considerably. What may be true
for the development into a modern society needs not be true for the
continued development into a postmodern society. The most prominent
example is the United States, where the decline of social trust has caused
some alarm. In 1995 Robert Putnam noted that the percentage showing
social trust in the USA had fallen from 58 in 1960 to 37 in 1990, a decline
which he believes to be a reflection of dissolution of communities, a growing
individualism, and a crisis of the institutional life.7 West Germany also
exhibits a case of declining social trust, at least in some periods, and its
level of 32 percent in 1999 does not match its economic growth compared
with the 1970s.
Actually, the Scandinavian countries are the only ones in which the level of
social trust has been above 50 percent both in the 1981 and 1990 survey of
the European Values Survey.8 In Denmark and Sweden the level had risen
to 66 percent in the 1999 values survey, and the 2001 election survey in
Denmark showed a level of 74 percent. This may be thought strange, as the
1990s have been marked by ethnic tensions in Denmark and an economic
downturn in Sweden, and crime has been a cause of concern in both
countries. Apparently, the complacency found in the Scandinavian political
culture tends to override the political problems discussed so eagerly in the
mass media. By contrast, the level of trust is as low as 17 percent in Latvia
and 19 percent in Poland, even though these countries are characterized by
an advancing economy and a positive development of civil society.
In the following, we shall attempt to account for the variation in social trust
at the level of individual citizens of the ten countries in the Baltic Sea area,
using various hypotheses as the point of departure.
Social networks
Mass society theory of the 1950s held that a pluralist society, as opposed to
a mass society, was characterized by networks of organisations and
voluntary associations. These networks acted as a buffer zone between the
government and the people. Extremist ideologies had few chances of
dominating a society in which most people interacted in overlapping
associations and received impulses from many directions. These networks
and groups were able to mobilize public opinion whenever the government
seemed to go too far in its policies or to lose contact with the general
population. Kornhauser’s The Politics of Mass Society is a prominent
example of such theorising.9
In recent years broadly similar ideas have found expression in Robert
Putnam’s concept of social capital, which is defined as “trust, norms, and
networks” which generate stability and progress in a society or local
community.10 According to this theory, social trust is one of the three main
components of social capital, and we may suppose that it develops in close
interaction with the other two components.
According to this theory we can expect social trust to be related to
association memberships among our respondents. The European Values
Survey (EVS) 1999 asks questions about membership of several types of
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are association members, we find indeed a fair correlation with the level of
trust:
Table 1: Pct. members of voluntary associations and pct. with
social trust.




West Germany 52.5 32.9







source: European Values Survey 1999.
The Scandinavian countries have membership rates of 80 percent or more,
and a trust level over 50 percent. The two German regions have
intermediate membership rates and trust levels. The five eastern countries
(Russia, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) all have membership rates
below 40 percent and trust levels below 30 percent.
Particularly worrying is the tendency of the five eastern countries to cluster
in the low end with low levels of social capital. The average level of social
trust in these countries is 21 percent, while the average of the other five is
53 percent. Between these two groups of countries there is a “gap” of 32
percent, which we shall attempt to explain as an effect of social, economic,
and political factors. Table 1 suggests that network theory goes part of the
way in explaining this gap, provided that association membership is related
to social trust at the level of individual respondents. And in this regard table
2 provides confirmation. Across all ten countries there exists a sound
correlation between social trust and the number of associations at the level
of individual respondents.
Table 2: Relation between social trust and association
memberships in the Baltic Sea region.
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3 memberships 60
4 or more memberships 75
source: European Values Survey 1999.
Those without any membership, nearly half the respondents, have a trust
level of only 25 percent, while in the other end, those with membership of
four or more associations have a trust level of 75 percent. The eta of this
relationship is 0.32, and the Pearson correlation r is also 0.32, indicating
that the relationship is linear. We may think of this as a mutually reinforcing
relationship. Being member of associations tends to lead to good
experiences of trusting other people, and in turn an attitude of trust leads
citizens to enter associations.
Before evaluating the success of network theory in accounting for the
different levels of social trust in the ten countries, we shall discuss two other
theories of social trust.
Social status
The hypothesis that social status affects social trust rests on simple
sociological reasoning. High-status people tend to encounter other
high-status people, and a prerequisite for staying in such circles is that one
can trust one another; lying or cheating is normally not tolerated. Low-status
members, on the other hand, have little choice as to whom they meet; their
experience is that since one meets all sorts of people, one must look after
oneself.
The most plausible measure of social status in this case is income, rather
than education. This is because educated persons with low income may be
frustrated, and thus they are not likely to conclude that “one can generally
trust other people”. Both income and school education is asked in the EVS,
and income is coded into ten levels within each country. In Table 3 these
are collapsed into five levels. In summing up these categories across the
ten countries we therefore ignore national differences in income level.
Those in the upper income level in Sweden are grouped together with those
in the upper level in Russia, and so forth. Therefore, the income scale
measures where one is located relative to others in one’s own country.
Table 3: Relation between social trust and household income
(quintiles) in the Baltic Sea region.
household income pct. with social trust




5. highest quintile 53
source: European Values Survey 1999.
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percent show social trust; among those in the higher group, 53 percent do
so. However, the difference is not as large as the difference between
association members and non-members; the eta correlation is 0.15, and the
linear r of the same magnitude.
It is interesting to find that if we relate social trust to the income level
(average GNP) of the country, we obtain a much higher correlation, even at
the level of the individual respondents, namely r = 0.34. That means, the
respondents’ answers to the question on social trust are much better
predicted from the average income level of others in their country than from
the income of their own families relative to other families in the country. In a
wealthy society social trust is likely to spread also to those who are less well
off.
Authoritarian values
When we reasoned about the effect of social status, we are inclined to
regard our question about social trust as a more or less objective record of
the respondent’s experience. Those with a surplus of positive encounters
with others are supposed to express trust, while those with a surplus of
negative encounters are supposed to show distrust. Now we turn to a
different interpretation of the response to the same question. As discussed
already in the classic study, The Authoritarian Personality from 1950,
authoritarian attitudes are likely to colour beliefs about the nature of society
and human beings.11 An authoritarian will believe that human nature is
irreparably lazy, selfish, sinful, etc., whereas a non-authoritarian believes it
to be fundamentally good. This difference is likely to be reflected also in the
response to the question about social trust, although such a hypothesis is
rarely investigated in the literature. We should expect authoritarians to show
distrust, non-authoritarians to show trust in other people, not so much
because they have reason to do this but because this is in accordance with
their basic views of human nature.
As for an indicator of such values, probably nothing can compare with the
ideals that guide people in upbringing their children. The EVS contains a
long series of properties that the respondents may wish to convey to their
children. From this series we have selected two that are supposedly
authoritarian and two that are supposed to be anti-authoritarian. The
authoritarian items are “obedience” and “good manners”; the
anti-authoritarian items are “imagination” and “independence”. By adding
the choices of these four items we compose an index of conformism. A
respondent who chooses the first two but not the last two has a conformism
score of +2; one who chooses the last two but not the first two has a score
of –2. One who chooses equally many from each side, or does not choose
any of the four items, has a score of 0.
Table 4: Relation between social trust and child rearing values in
the Baltic Sea region.
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source: European Values Survey 1999.
Conformism in child education indeed relates to social distrust, as Table 4
demonstrates. Those in the two conformist categories are much less likely
to show trust (27–28 percent) than those in the most non-conformist
category (67 percent). The strength of the relationship comes out in an eta
of 0.21 and an r of –0.195. It is a stronger cause of social trust than income.
The different tradition of upbringing in different countries may explain part of
the national variation in social trust that we have noted. In general, the
Scandinavian countries and Germany have an inclination for non-conform
responses. 40 percent of the Swedish, Danish and West German
respondents are in one of the two non-conformist categories. Only ten
percent in Estonia and 13 percent in Poland are in these categories. But
there are deviant cases. Finland has only 19 percent non-conformists,
whereas Lithuania has 43 percent! Hence conformism can only be one out
of several explanatory factors in social distrust. To the extent that it is a
factor, however, the implication of it is that one cannot expect to increase
social trust in a society in the short run. Values in child education are a
deep-rooted part of a society’s culture, and are not likely to change
drastically from one decade to the next.
Combined effect of network, income, and conformity
We have studied three sources of social trust: networks (memberships in
voluntary associations), family income, and non-conformity in child rearing.
They have been shown to operate in accordance with mainstream theory
across the population samples of the countries bordering the Baltic Sea; but
to complete the picture we also need to show that they operate within the
individual countries that have been sampled. This is brought out in Table 5.
Table 5: Regression of social trust in the countries in the Baltic
Sea region on net-works (no. of association memberships),
personal income, and conformity in child rearing values.




country network effect (1 to
5)
Sweden .08 .02 –.09 .28
Denmark .05 .05 –.10 .38
Finland .06 .01 –.06 .40
West
Germany
.05 .02 –.07 .17
East Germany .06 .03 –.07 .23
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Russia .03 .00 –.01 .21
Lithuania .08 .03 –.05 .12
Latvia .05 .00 –.01 .12
Estonia .06 .02 –.02 .13
source: European Values Survey 1999.
The ten rows of the table represent ten independent tests of the
hypothetical relationships between social trust and its sources. The effects
show the change in percent trusting that is associated with a change of one
step in the network, income, or conformity variable, all of which are
measured on a five-point scale.
As seen from the first column of figures, the effect of association
membership is everywhere positive, varying from eight percent in Sweden
and Lithuania to three percent in Poland and Russia. This means that
among Swedish and Lithuanian respondents, the proportion showing social
trust rises by eight percent for each step in the network variable, that is, by
32 percent across the whole range from 1 to 5; in Poland and Russia the
same proportion rises by only twelve percent.
The second column shows the effect of family income (relative to others in
the same country). This is generally weaker, varying from five percent in
Denmark to none in Russia and Latvia. The third column shows that the
effect of conformity in child rearing is as expected negative everywhere,
ranging from ten percent in Denmark to one percent in Russia and Latvia.
Except for Lithuania, the effect of child rearing values is low in the eastern
countries.
On the basis of these effects we can conclude that roughly the same
sources of social trust are present in all of the countries, even though some
effects tend to vanish in one or two countries. Especially in Russia and
Poland the effects are quite small, and in Latvia and Estonia only the
membership effect is sizeable.
Nonetheless, the three sources we have studied do not account for the
national differences in social trust observed in Table 1. In particular the gap
between the western and the eastern countries is largely left unexplained.
This is seen if we group the ten countries in a western group, containing
those countries in the upper five rows, and an eastern group, containing
those in the lower five rows. The pervasive difference between the western
and the eastern group of countries may be illustrated by Tables 6 and 7,
which show the level of social trust by groups defined by their number of
association memberships and their degree of conformity in child rearing.
Table 6: Relation between social trust and association
memberships in the western and eastern Baltic Sea region.
no. of association memberships pct. with social trust
Western region Eastern region
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1 membership 49 24
2 memberships 58 30
3 memberships 63 29
4 or more memberships 78 38
source: European Values Survey 1999.
Table 7: Relation between social trust and child rearing values in
the western and eastern Baltic Sea region.
child rearing values pct. with social trust
Western region Eastern region




5. non-conformity 74 31
source: European Values Survey 1999.
Separating the ten countries into an eastern and a western set, we find that
whether we look at association membership or non-conformism both the
level of trust and the effects of our variables are much larger in the western
countries than in the eastern ones. In the western countries social trust
rises from 39 to 78 percent as we move from those with no membership to
those with four or more memberships.
In the eastern countries trust rises only from 20 to 38 percent (Table 6). A
similar tendency is noted when we look at the effects of non-conformism
(Table 7). Roughly, twice as many show trust in the western countries than
in the eastern ones in each category. The factors influencing social trust
appear to work much more efficiently in the western countries than in the
eastern ones.
Part of the reason for this difference in explanatory power may be poorer
interviewing in the eastern countries, which generates “noise” in the
relationships. However, casual or sloppy interviewing cannot explain the
different level of trust in the two groups that remains after controlling for
association membership or child rearing values. In an attempt to close this
gap we turn toward political explanations of social trust and distrust.
The politics of social trust and distrust
Social trust and distrust are by definition non-political concepts. To agree
that “most people can be trusted”, or that “one has to be careful” does not
give a clue as to the political persuasion of the respondent. Likewise, the
factors we have discussed so far do not appear to have any political
content. Being a member of several associations and teaching one’s
children to be independent and imaginative rather than obedient and polite
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have discussed so far are social and economic rather than political.
However, the low level of interpersonal trust in Russia, Poland, Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania suggests that political experiences of the citizens have
played a role in making them cautious when dealing with strangers. This
would agree with the low level of network participation in the same countries
that we saw already in Table 1. As argued in the beginning, the communist
heritage may play a role in preventing the social capital from rising in these
countries, although this has not been the case in East Germany.
We shall connect social trust with some political views in order to study this
gap between the western and the former communist countries. Is social
distrust concentrated in particular parties and among adherents of particular
ideologies? If so, which are these parties and ideologies? Is the widespread
distrust related to negative feelings about the political system or a tradition
for not openly criticising the system? Or is it connected with ethnic and
national tensions that have come to the fore in the eastern countries since
the fall of the autocratic regimes around 1990? These possibilities will be
investigated in turn.
Socialists and Liberals
The distinction between left and right ideology has been a major trait of
western democracies for over a century. And after the establishment of
party systems in the post-communist countries in the early 1990s, this
distinction has emerged also in the eastern Baltic Sea region. Governments
have shifted between parties of the centre-right and centre-left, presenting
different policy platforms and perhaps even executing them so as to
accustom the voting public to the differences between left and right
ideology. How have citizens with higher or lower levels of social trust
responded to such policy differences?
There are certain reasons for expecting people with low trust to be drawn
toward the liberal parties. Liberal ideology encourages people to rely on
themselves rather than others for earning their income and getting ahead in
life. Competition rather than solidarity is seen as a basic feature of society.
However, other arguments count in the opposite direction. Liberal parties
appeal to the business community and the upper status layers, that is, to
people who tend to form networks and organisations. Socialist parties are
supposed to get their voters from those who have few resources, and who
fear that they may be left behind as the economy moves ahead.
A number of questions in the European Values Survey addresses these
ideological differences. One question asks whether people themselves,
rather than the state, should take more responsibility for providing for the
citizens’ needs. A second question is whether competition is good or
harmful. A third asks if people who are unemployed should be obliged to
take available jobs. And a fourth is whether firms should have more
freedom or be subjected to control from the state. Each question is
answered by the respondent by using a scale from one to ten, and adding
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Dividing the respondents into four categories we find a general tendency for
the liberals to be more trustful than the socialists. Across all ten countries
the percentage showing social trust rises from 29 among the socialists to 46
among the liberalists. Part of this difference of 17 percentage points is due
to the fact that there is a preponderance of liberalists in the western
countries but a preponderance of socialists in the eastern ones.
Nonetheless, the pattern is found even if we look at the eastern countries
separately. Here, 19 percent of the socialists indicate trust as against 29
percent of the liberalists.
But this does not mean that left-wing parties build on support from the
distrustful in all countries. In Estonia in 1999 the Reform Party had the most
trusting voters (38 percent), while the Pro Patria voters were lower (30
percent) and the Centre Party voters still lower (23 percent). In Latvia the
voters of the People’s Party and Latvia’s Way were equal in social trust
(both 16 percent). In Lithuania the Centre Union and the Liberal Union
voters were practically equal (28 and 27 percent trusting). In Poland the
Democratic Left voters and Solidarity voters were almost even (21 and 20
percent trusting), while the Peasant Party’s voters were sagging (17
percent). The highest level of trust was found among the Freedom Union
voters (25 percent). Finally, in Russia there was little difference between the
levels of trust among Fatherland party voters (26 percent) and Yabloko
voters (27 percent), whereas the Communist voters were sagging a little (23
percent).
Apparently, there is little support for the thesis that social distrust is
concentrated in the voters of particular parties in the eastern countries.
Rather, the difference runs across party lines: voters giving liberal
responses tend to be more trusting than voters giving socialist responses
within the same party.
Democratic satisfaction and political activism
As previously mentioned, comparative studies have indicated a relationship
between the level of social trust in a society and the stability of democracy.
This may very well be mirrored at the level of individual citizens, so that
those citizens who are satisfied with the democratic performance of their
political system tend also to have more social trust than the dissatisfied.
The causality probably runs in both directions: those who believe that
democracy is working efficiently have less inhibition in revealing their
opinions to strangers, and in turn, being rewarded by communicating with
strangers breeds the feeling that democracy is working.
We may here investigate the responses to the EVS item on how satisfied
one is with the way democracy is working in one’s country. Looking first at
the averages for the countries (Table 8), the relationship indeed shows a
tendency for the countries to cluster into a western and an eastern group;
but within each cluster there is very little consistency in the relationship.
Table 8: Relation between social trust and satisfaction with
democracy.
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West Germany 78 33
Denmark 67 67









source: European Values Survey 1999.
In the western cluster, West Germans are the most satisfied with their
democracy, though as we have noted earlier, they are sagging in social
trust. In the eastern cluster the countries vary quite a lot in regard to how
satisfied their citizens are, from 45 percent in Poland to seven percent in
Russia. In particular the examples of Poland and West Germany suggest
that social trust does not follow automatically from satisfaction with
democracy. The Poles are much more satisfied with their democracy than
the Russians are, yet both seem to live in a culture of social distrust.
However, if we compare the satisfied with the dissatisfied, either across all
countries or within each country, there can be no doubt that those satisfied
with democracy tend also to be those with social trust. Across all countries
the level of trust is 48 percent among those being satisfied with democracy,
but only 30 percent among those who are dissatisfied. We may therefore
expect satisfaction with democracy to contribute in narrowing the gap
between the western and the eastern countries in our sample.
Another variable supposedly related to social trust is political activism. In
countries where the regime has, perhaps for decades, prohibited activism, it
seems likely that social trust will be undermined by a lingering suspicion in
the population that sticking out one’s neck will be registered by the
authorities. We therefore expect countries with a high frequency of political
activism to display a high level of social trust, whereas countries without a
tradition for activism should have a low trust level.
As a measure of political activism, the EVS probes into the citizens’
participation in five types of unconventional political behaviour: signing
petitions, joining demonstrations, joining strikes, joining boycotts, and
occupying buildings. On these items the respondents can be scored on an
index from one to five.12
As shown in Table 9, the western countries, and especially Sweden, have
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Table 9: Relation between social trust and average number of
unconventional politi-cal activities per person.
country average no. of activities pct. with social trust
Sweden 2.55 66
Denmark 2.08 67
East Germany 1.79 43
Finland 1.67 58







source: European Values Survey 1999.
We find the western group of countries spread over a range from 2.5 to 1.5
activities per respondent, whereas the eastern group clusters around a
mean of 1 activity per respondent. As was the case with voluntary
associations in Table 2, participation in unconventional political activities
bears a clear relationship with social trust, at least at the national level.
Even more than Table 8, Table 9 leaves the impression that social capital
has more to do with political factors than is assumed in mainstream theory.
Nationalism and the pluralist society
A political debate that has dominated the latest decades of both western
and eastern politics has been spurred by issues of national sovereignty,
national minorities, and immigration. In many western countries
anti-immigration parties have been added to the traditional party systems. In
the eastern region the existence of national minorities has been a barrier
against the drive for autonomy.
The cleavage line here runs between those who want their country to
constitute a rather homogeneous “people” or “nation”, and those who
welcome a more plural society with open borders. According to some
indicators the nationalists have a stronger standing in the eastern countries
than in the western ones. The EVS asks a series of questions regarding
different groups whom the respondents would not like to have as their
neighbours. The result is that in the western region, ten percent mention
“immigrants and foreign workers”, while in the eastern region, 18 percent do
so. The lowest national figure is three percent in Sweden. The highest
figures are 24 percent in Poland and Lithuania. Thus, even though it
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However, there are other indicators that show roughly the same opinion
level in the eastern and western region. This is the case, for example, with
the responses to a question in the EVS asking for the respondent’s attitude
toward immigration. Should immigration be prohibited, should it at least be
limited, should it be allowed provided that jobs are vacant, or should there
be free immigration for all who want to come? The last two, which must be
regarded as positive till immigration, add up to 40 percent in the western
region and 44 percent in the eastern region.
How is social trust related to the attitude to immigration? At this point our
expectations are less ambivalent than in the case of the left-right cleavage:
we expect social trust to be associated with the more open, cosmopolitan
outlook. As we gathered from the discussion about child rearing values, the
authoritarian mind tends to think in terms of ingroups and outgroups and to
be suspicious of outgroups.
Table 10: Relation between attitude to immigration and social
trust in the western and eastern Baltic Sea region.
attitude to immigration pct. with social trust
Western region Eastern region
forbid immigration 29 17
set limits to immigration 48 20
only when jobs are vacant 59 24
allow all who want 73 29
source: European Values Survey 1999.
Our data in Table 10 is in accordance with the hypothesis. The attitude to
immigration is related in the expected direction to social trust, especially in
the western countries. However, one also notes that in each row there is a
sizeable gap between western and eastern countries. The pattern is similar
to what we have already seen in Tables 6 and 7 with regard to networks and
conformity.
Evaluation of effects
The first question we raised in the beginning was whether social trust was
related to the same set of factors in the eastern and the western countries
of the Baltic Sea region. The answer that has emerged in the preceding
sections is that, indeed, the factors which generate trusting citizens are
much the same within each of the two groups of countries, but these factors
do not explain the large difference between the western and the eastern
countries. For example, given the level of participation in social and political
associations, a citizen of the western region is twice as likely to express
trust in strangers as a citizen of the eastern region (Table 6). The difference
is even sharper when we turn from behavioural indicators to indicators of
social and political values, such as conformity in child rearing. Even those in
the western region who brought up their children to be obedient and
conforming, tend to be more trusting than those in the eastern region who
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We now assemble these separate relationships into regression models
showing the controlled effects of social variables, political variables, and
geographical region upon social trust. Table 11 shows regression effects in
three models: one for the social and economic factors, one for the political
factors, and one for all of them combined. In order to express the gap
between the western and the eastern group of countries, a dummy variable
is included, taking the value of 1 for the western and 0 for the eastern
group.
Table 11: Regression of social trust on social and political factors
in the countries of the Baltic Sea region. Unstandardised b
coefficients.
independent variable social factors political factors both combined
Networks .075 .064
family income .025 .024
conformity –.052 –.039
socialist ideology –.016 –.00513
democratic satisfaction .049 .060
political activism .059 .028
resistance to immigration –.070 –.047
western country .20 .22 .15
multiple correlation .41 .38 .42
source: European Values Survey 1999.
A social model is presented in the first column of figures. It is dominated by
network participation, measured as association memberships, as predictor
of social trust, with an effect of 7.5 percent. Conformity in child rearing is
second in place, while relative family income is a less important predictor.
Together, the three variables leave a gap of 20 percent between western
and eastern countries, as indicated by the coefficient of the dummy
variable.
A political model of social trust is presented in the second column. The
important predictors are here political activism, resistance to immigration,
and democratic satisfaction, while ideology is less important. Controlling for
these factors leaves a gap of 22 percent between the western and the
eastern countries. By comparing the multiple correlations of the two models
(bottom row) we find that social trust can be predicted almost as well from
political attitudes as from the social variables in the first model. The
correlation is not impressive in either model; but our simple measure of
social trust, based on a two-way response to a single question, probably
contains a large amount of unreliability. This sets an upper limit to the
magnitude of the correlation.
The third column shows the coefficients of a model that combines the social
and the political model. In this combined mode, the most important
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with democracy. But also conformity in child rearing and resistance to
immigration are rather important in distinguishing the trustful from the
distrustful. Political activism is somewhat less important, as this variable
tends to duplicate network participation as a predictor. In this combined
model the gap between east and west has been reduced to 15 percentage
points, indicating that geographical region is still an important factor in
social trust even after controlling all other factors.
Conclusion
This study has focused on social trust, or interpersonal trust, because of its
standing as a key variable indicating the strength of civil society. We have
compared ten countries in the Baltic Sea region dividing Germany into West
and East Germany. We have found that within each country, social trust is
positively related especially to network participation, and negatively related
to authoritarian values. Everywhere, the distrustful are primarily people
standing outside the networks of associations and valuing conformity in
child rearing. Politically, these people are found both on the left and right;
they are characterised by being politically passive, even though they are
dissatisfied with the way democracy is working, and are opposed to
immigrants.
These findings make sense, and they are by no means trivial if we compare
them with other studies in the field. However, the model’s failure to account
for the generally higher level of trust in the western countries, compared
with the eastern ones, deserves a comment. There are at least two
plausible factors that may explain the residual gap of 15 percentage points
in the level of social trust. One is the possibility that social trust is related to
absolute income rather than relative income. The interview studies do not
contain information about the (dollar or euro) value of the respondents’
incomes. Were we to include the mean national GNP in the regression
model, the gap would be reversed to a negative one, because the income
level in the eastern countries is vastly lower than that in the western
countries. Incidentally, the fact that East Germany sides with the western
group of countries would also be accounted for, since the mean GNP in
East Germany is much higher than in the other pre-communist countries.
The outcome would be a line of thinking, popular among some modern
economists, who view social capital as a special type of production factor
that enhances market and credit transactions.
The other plausible factor is, of course, the history of eastern regimes. As
mentioned in the beginning, comparative studies have found a rather strong
relationship between the level of social trust and the number of years of
unbroken democratic rule. On the one hand, a civil society must have grown
to maturity before democratic institutions, built so to speak on top of it,
acquire sufficient legitimacy to survive those political and economic crises
that are bound to come sooner or later. On the other hand, those political
elites who man the democratic institutions in the early phase must be
committed to democratic procedures; for example, one or more non-violent
changes of government must have taken place before democratic norms
spread to the population at large. These historical experiences may well be
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interview questions. Mass interview surveys provide many important clues
for the study of political cultures, because they permit a study of individual
citizens at given points in time. But they need to be supplemented by
institutional and historical studies in order to pay justice to the complexity of
their subject.
1  Dieser Aufsatz ist ein überarbeiteter Vorabdruck aus: Schartau,
Mai-Brith et al. (eds.): Political Cultures, Values and Identities in the
Baltic Sea Region. Berlin 2006.
2 Giddens, Anthony: The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge 1990.
3 Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba: The Civic Culture: Political
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton 1963.
4 Newton, Kenneth: “Social and Political Support in Established
Democracies”. In: Pippa Norris (ed.): Critical Citizens: Global Support for
Democratic Governance. Oxford 1999, 169–187.
5 Inglehart, Ronald: Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society.
Princeton 1990, 36–37.
6 Idem: Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic and
Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton 1997, 174.
7 Putnam, Robert D.: “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social
Capital”. In: Journal of Democracy 6 (1995), 65–78.
8 Newton 1999, as footnote 3.
9 Kornhauser, William: The Politics of Mass Society. London 1960.
10 Putnam, Robert D.: Making Democracy Work. Princeton 1993.
11 Adorno, Theodor W. et al.: The Authoritarian Personality. New
York 1950.
12 The questions asked whether the respondent had participated or
might participate in each activity. Those who might participate were here
scored ½, so that the index ran 0, ½, 1, 1½, 2 … etc.
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